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ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF WRONGDOING
Janice Nadler*
THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Yuval Feldman. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press. 2018. Pp. xvii, 234. $34.99.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2019, over fifty people were criminally charged with partici-
pating in a scheme to gain fraudulent student admissions to various U.S.
universities. The investigation—dubbed Operation Varsity Blues—
uncovered fabricated athletic portfolios, bribes paid to athletic coaches and
university administrators, money laundered through a fake charity, and im-
postors paid to cheat on standardized tests and take online courses to pad
high school transcripts.1 At the center of the scheme was an “admissions
consultant” who acted as a fixer and whose clients consisted of dozens of
wealthy parents who paid him to lie, cheat, bribe, and defraud their chil-
dren’s way into elite universities.2 The parents included real estate develop-
ers, CEOs, investment executives, lawyers, doctors, and prominent
Hollywood stars.3
How did these individuals end up engaging in plainly nefarious felony
criminal offenses? There is no backstory here of economic, educational, or
social deprivation; to the contrary, the parents were some of the most advan-
taged individuals in the nation, and yet they convinced themselves they
needed more. Why did these occupants of society’s highest professional and
* Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School
of Law; Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. Thanks to Joshua Nathan for outstand-
ing research assistance, and to Deb Tuerkheimer, Max Schanzenbach, and Andrew Lanham for
helpful feedback. I thank the American Bar Foundation and the Nathaniel and Leah Na-
thanson Research fund at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law for financial sup-
port.
1. See Graham Kates, Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman Among Dozens Charged in




3. Who Are the 33 Parents Charged in the College Admissions Cheating Scandal?, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 12, 2019, 11:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-are-the-33-parents-
charged-in-the-college-admissions-cheating-scandal-11552443487 (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
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financial ranks decide to involve themselves in a criminal scheme when there
was so much at risk for them? How did they overlook or simply ignore moral
red flags when they decided to participate? Some of the perpetrators were
likely fully aware of both the criminal and unethical nature of their behavior.
But others seem to have participated by convincing themselves that this is
how the “system” works.4 How did they blind themselves to the moral mean-
ing of their behavior?
It is tempting to explain events like these as the simple product of the
behavior of a few bad apples. But in his comprehensive book The Law of
Good People: Challenging States’ Ability to Regulate Human Behavior, Yuval
Feldman5 counters this simplistic explanation with a more nuanced, evi-
dence-based account of wrongdoing. Feldman’s thesis is that misconduct is
often the product of people who are more ordinary than they are evil, who
slide unthinkingly into unethical and even criminal behavior by blinding
themselves to the ethical implications of their actions.
Feldman’s thesis is evidence based because it relies upon a body of em-
pirical research in the emerging field of Behavioral Ethics. This research
demonstrates—across a range of different contexts and across a wide variety
of individuals—that wrongdoing is remarkably easy to provoke, in part be-
cause people fail to fully recognize the ethical implications of their actions.
The perpetrators of everyday wrongs glide seamlessly into unethical behav-
ior by constructing rationales that allow them to maintain a positive view of
themselves. Thus, a city official who accepts a “gift” of expensive Super Bowl
tickets from a contractor bidding on a city project can maintain his self-
image as a good person by mentally separating the act of accepting tickets
(which he just did) from the act of accepting cash (which he would never
do), as if there were some meaningful difference.6 In this context, these con-
structed categories (e.g., tickets versus cash) make it easier for actors to con-
vince themselves that their acts are morally unproblematic.
The findings of Behavioral Ethics have received attention by organiza-
tional behavior scholars and now are being taught routinely in business
schools, but they have yet to be taken up in a systematic way by legal schol-
4. See Vanessa Romo, Actress Felicity Huffman Sentenced to 14 Days in College Admis-
sions Scandal, NPR (Sept. 13, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/13/759256335
/actress-felicity-huffman-sentenced-to-14-days-in-college-admissions-scandal [https://perma
.cc/F5V9-38XT].
5. Mori Lazarof Professor of Legal Research, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law.
6. See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO
EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2013). Ariely placed either a six pack of Coke or a plate
with six one-dollar bills in several communal dormitory refrigerators on a college campus.
Within a few days, nearly all of the Cokes were gone but none of the dollar bills were taken. Id.
at 32. People are more likely to behave dishonestly to gain nonmonetary objects than actual
money. In a laboratory experiment, participants were paid according to the number of math
problems they reported solving. About twice as many participants cheated when they were
paid in tokens (which they immediately exchanged for cash at another table a few feet away)
than when they were paid directly in cash. Nina Mazar, et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People:
A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008).
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ars. The empirical Behavioral Ethics literature, though fairly new, has now
developed sufficiently that there are some lessons that can be drawn from it,
not only for business leaders managing organizations but also for legal insti-
tutions managing compliance with law.
In his book, Feldman argues that people’s limited awareness of the un-
ethical nature of their behavior requires redesigning legal rules to anticipate
this aspect of human psychology. Indeed, there are domains in which gov-
ernment already seems to have designed systems to prevent inevitable un-
lawful behavior by ordinary people. For example, when given the
opportunity many people underpay taxes legally owed, often because they
convince themselves that others are behaving similarly and so underpaying
is socially and ethically normative. But when the opportunity to underpay is
removed (through, for example, mandatory withholding of tax from em-
ployee wages), compliance becomes highly likely.7 In this way, the question
of law’s reach extends not only to punishing bad behavior and compensating
victims after the fact but also to preventing people from committing wrong-
ful conduct in the first place, through mechanisms other than threat of pun-
ishment.
Part I of this Review examines Feldman’s synthesis of existing Behavior-
al Ethics research and his analysis of its implications for law. A central claim
of the book is that law should devote more resources to regulating “ordinary
unethicality”—contract breach, tortious conduct, property-rights violations,
public corruption, tax cheating, and corporate misconduct (p. ix). Law cur-
rently is structured to best address serious harms carried out by individuals
explicitly committed to advancing their material self-interests. But most
wrongdoing is committed by individuals who see themselves as simply
“bend[ing] the laws within the confines of their conscience” (p. x). Feld-
man’s bottom line is that because people are often unaware of the moral
meaning of their behavior, law must focus on identifying and regulating that
behavior before the fact, rather than punishing it afterwards.
Part II explores an important category of wrongdoing for which the tra-
ditional regulatory approach of threats of punishment ex post might in many
cases be suboptimal: corruption. This category provides examples of settings
where actors are difficult to deter within standard enforcement frameworks
because their motivations are complex. Concern for the well-being of others
or of their organization can tempt people to cheat on behalf of others, espe-
cially when they themselves derive some benefit, but even sometimes when
they do not. Thinking about the benefits to others makes cheating easier to
rationalize because helping others does not feel selfish. Feelings of empathy
exacerbate this temptation, and cheating in groups can also enhance this dy-
namic.
Even when people are acting solely on behalf of themselves, they can be
more inclined to cheat depending on their relative position. Some corrup-
tion occurs in the context of power, whether it is economic, social, or con-
7. See p. 86.
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textual. An individual’s high social class and power increase their likelihood
of engaging in unethical behavior that benefits the self and is facilitated by
euphemistic language. Corruption is also enabled by gray zones (such as
university admissions advantages for important donors) that are constructed
to benefit those in positions of social and economic power. The structure of
these situations permits these actors to convince themselves that their acts
are ethical (or simply outside the domain of morality).
Part III offers a regulatory approach that goes beyond traditional legal
enforcement practices. Although I join Feldman in his call to consider ap-
proaches to legal regulation better suited to shaping behavior ex ante, it is
my contention that this approach should not be limited to a discrete group
of “good people” that, according to Feldman, regulators have overlooked.
Instead, I will argue that the motivation to see oneself as ethical and to inter-
pret one’s own behavior in the most flattering light is pervasive. As a result,
the power of denial undermines the deterrent power of law across a wide va-
riety of people and situations. In the end, it is not clear that Feldman’s cen-
tral framework of three types of people (erroneous wrongdoers, situational
wrongdoers, and bad people) is especially useful for the project of rethinking
legal regulation. What is clear, however, is that law must broadly take ac-
count of the emerging Behavioral Ethics evidence. Regulation must be de-
signed to shape environments to make it difficult to slide unconsciously into
unethical behavior ex ante.
Building on my earlier work on expressive law and social norms,8 I de-
velop an alternative conception of compliance that supplements threatened
sanctions with leveraging the expressive power of law to decrease the likeli-
hood that people will deceive themselves about the social and ethical mean-
ing of their behavior. Theories of expressive law posit that law can influence
behavior through means that go beyond the legal sanctions threatened for
violation.9 I will specifically focus on informational expressive law: the idea
that the state can deploy law to provide information that can change indi-
vidual beliefs and social norms, which in turn can shape behavior (p. 172).
By leveraging the informational function of expressive law, the state can
identify situations in which individuals are likely to fail to fully appreciate
the meaning of their behavior. Identifying and sorting “good people,” I ar-
gue, is less important than identifying situations and structures that are
amenable to legal interventions that leverage social norms.
8. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point
Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental
Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2005); Janice Nadler, Expressive Law, So-
cial Norms, and Social Groups, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 60 (2017).
9. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS
(2015).
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The Law of Good People correctly points out that the more ordinary un-
ethicality of “good people” (such as corporate misconduct, contract breach,
and tax cheating) should be targeted for attention using a modified set of en-
forcement tools from those used to punish more serious misconduct (p. ix).
At the same time, the general claim that the law should focus more attention
on the bad behavior of “good people” glosses over the patterns of excess at-
tention of law in the form of relentless criminalization of the common pre-
dicaments of poor people and especially poor people of color. This overen-
overenforcement is perversely coupled with underenforcement of serious
crime within the same communities. Just as expressive law can be deployed
to root out ordinary unethicality, it also holds promise for affirming the
worth of members of socially disempowered communities by stepping up
state responses to violence10 and stepping down state deprivation of individ-
ual liberty as a means for raising revenue and generally asserting social con-
trol.11
I. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS AND LAW
One of the central building blocks of Behavioral Ethics involves a tenet
of human psychology: people seek to promote their own self-interest to the
extent that they can continue to feel good about themselves (p. 11). The rea-
son for this fundamental tendency is that individuals sometimes find them-
selves torn between two competing motivations: gaining from the benefits of
wrongdoing versus maintaining a positive view of oneself (p. 50). These du-
eling motivations bend and cave to accommodate one another. For example,
we follow a questionable act with a good deed to prove to ourselves that
we’re good (pp. 50–51). Sometimes we even follow a good deed with a ques-
tionable act because we’ve “earned it” or established ourselves as good and
moral.12
The more established field of Behavioral Law and Economics is con-
cerned with mapping flaws in human cognition and showing how they cause
decisionmakers to depart from optimal decisions (p. 33). Examples include
the tendency to value property more when one already owns it than when
one has not yet acquired it (the endowment effect) and the tendency to per-
ceive an outcome as more inevitable after the fact than before the fact (hind-
10. Janice Nadler, “Deserve Got Nothin’ to Do with It:” The Value of Homicide Victims in
The Wire, 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 186–87; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the
Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1163–64 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)).
11. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15 (2015); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL
COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018).
12. P. 51; see also Benoît Monin & Alexander H. Jordan, The Dynamic Moral Self: A So-
cial Psychological Perspective, in PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 341 (Darcia Narvaez & Daniel K. Lapsley eds., 2009).
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sight bias). Behavioral Ethics, by contrast, focuses on how people make deci-
sions to engage in behavior with an ethical dimension (p. 3).
Perhaps the most important distinction between Behavioral Law and
Economics on the one hand and Behavioral Ethics on the other is the scope
of the concept of self-interest (p. 34). The narrow material self-interest as-
sumed by Behavioral Law and Economics is expanded by Behavioral Ethics
researchers to also encompass “a need to maintain a positive and coherent
view of the self” (p. 35), especially with regard to being a good and honest
person. Further, Behavioral Ethics approaches recognize that this motivation
often operates beneath the level of conscious awareness, with people making
choices in order to maintain their positive self-concept without ever realizing
that they have this motivation or that it is influencing them (p. 35).
One key concept is that of limited awareness: people often “do wrong
without fully grasping the meaning of their behavior” (p. 40). Because self-
interested behavior is often largely automatic, individuals often interpret
ethical situations through an egocentric lens without realizing it (pp. 44–45).
Thus, they find ways to promote their material self-interest while also pro-
tecting their ethical self-image. One strategy is the ostrich head in the sand,
in which people avoid learning the full (unethical) consequences of decisions
that benefit themselves (p. 41). This gives people “moral wiggle room” to de-
ny, even if just to themselves, that they are engaging in unethical behavior
(p. 50). For example, a person who suspects he might have an STD might
avoid getting tested so that he can continue to have sex without having the
duty to inform each sexual partner of his status.13
Moral disengagement often plays a pivotal role in decisions to behave
unethically (pp. 51–53). For example, key leaders of Penn State University
repeatedly referred to Jerry Sandusky’s rape of a young boy on campus as
“horsing around” during the time in which they decided not to report it to
law enforcement.14 Denigrating, dehumanizing, and blaming the victim is
also a way of morally disengaging from one’s own unethical behavior. The
opportunity to deploy a placebic reason for acting also encourages people to
frame their decisions as morally unproblematic. For example, participants in
laboratory experiments played a game in which they were awarded a cash
payment that depended on the roll of a die. Participants were asked to pri-
vately roll the die and report the results. Because they knew that the outcome
would not be verified, a certain percentage of participants cheated on this
task. But the frequency of cheating increased substantially when participants
were asked to roll the die twice and report only the first roll. Fabricating a
number from thin air was apparently more difficult to morally disengage
13. Cf. Jason Dana et al., What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Me: Costly (but Quiet) Exit
in Dictator Games, 100 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 193 (2006)
(reporting a study suggesting that people are more likely to choose a route to selfish behavior
that ensures that the person affected remains unaware of being taken advantage of, even if
choosing this route is more costly).
14. Kristen Lucas & Jeremy P. Fyke, Euphemisms and Ethics: A Language-Centered
Analysis of Penn State’s Sexual Abuse Scandal, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 551 (2014).
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from than taking the best of two actual rolls of the die (p. 53). Moral disen-
gagement and other types of moral self-deception reduce psychological dis-
comfort by permitting the decisionmaker to maintain moral self-regard.
Feldman argues that securing compliance with law requires focusing on
people’s motivations for acting as well as on their level of awareness that they
are engaging in some form of wrongdoing (p. 61). For this purpose, he iden-
tifies three mindsets of wrongdoing: (1) “Bad” calculative people who “delib-
erately engage in unethical behavior” with full awareness of its wrongfulness,
(2) “[S]ituational wrongdoers” who engage in unethical actions but who
maintain their self-concept as a good person by deploying rationalizations,
and (3) “[E]rroneous wrongdoers” who do not actively seek rationalizations
for their wrongdoing because it never occurs to them that their acts might be
wrong (p. 61). Feldman is careful to point out that these categories do not
always have defined boundaries; the purpose is to design enforcement mech-
anisms that take into account these varying mindsets (p. 61).
Given these three mindsets underlying wrongdoing, it becomes apparent
that the economic model of deterrence is not well suited to influence the be-
havior of situational wrongdoers and erroneous wrongdoers. Threats of pun-
ishment in these cases are less effective because punishment is perceived as
being reserved for wrongdoers, which these individuals are convinced refers
to other (“bad”) people (pp. 68–69). Social norms can sometimes serve as
guidelines for maintaining one’s positive moral self-concept, and legal regu-
lation can help develop and enforce social norms. Regulatory designs that
respond to various motivations for wrongdoing in a context-sensitive fash-
ion can address unethicality that does not fully emerge into conscious
awareness (p. 86). These include structural solutions such as mandatory
withholding of tax from wages, breath alcohol ignition lock devices to pre-
vent drunk driving, and traffic engineering solutions that discourage speed-
ing, such as speed bumps, traffic circles, chevrons (a pattern that creates the
illusion of moving faster, causing drivers to slow down), and rippled shoul-
ders. Structural solutions have only just begun to be explored.15 At the same
time, structural solutions cannot feasibly prevent all misconduct, and legal
policymakers need to consider other enforcement mechanisms to take into
account people’s limited awareness of the unethical nature of their own
wrongdoing.
The tension between promoting one’s material self-interest and protect-
ing one’s ethical self-image is often resolved through means that do not
reach the level of conscious awareness. For example, when a person per-
ceives that others are engaging in an unethical action, whether that percep-
tion is correct or not, that individual is more likely to also engage in it
(p. 106). Law sometimes can counteract this perception by indicating societal
consensus. Both legislation and court decisions sometimes can signal what is
socially approved and disapproved. For example, the legalization of same-sex
15. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 657 (2006).
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marriage in the United States came from a combination of state court deci-
sions and state legislation, culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling
striking down state laws banning same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges
in 2015.16 All the while, law reflected increasing public support for same-sex
marriage.17 By signaling public opinion, law can express social norms and
can increase compliance by encouraging people to internalize these norms.
Feldman addresses the question of how governments can encourage au-
tomatic ethical behavior (Chapter Eight). The Behavioral Ethics literature
has begun to provide insight regarding the circumstances under which indi-
viduals are likely to be unaware of the ethical dimension of their behavior. In
some of these situations, expressive law can function to highlight the prevail-
ing social norm, undermining the opportunity for individuals to convince
themselves that their contemplated act is consistent with being a good per-
son (pp. 172–73). When law is integrated into social life through education
and public information campaigns, the social meaning of once innocuous
acts such as drunk driving, smoking, and foregoing seat belts can be trans-
ported into the domain of the moral, giving pause to those contemplating
them.18 Changing the social meaning of certain acts can strengthen internal
motivation to perceive them within the moral domain and act accordingly
(p. 172).
In social life the motivations of individuals making decisions are often
mixed. The city council member who votes in favor of a finance measure
feels persuaded by the strong argument of the lobbyist and believes he can
easily ignore the possibility of future financial support. Unclear or ambigu-
ous legal rules enable individuals to feel confident that their unethical action
is in fact ethical (pp. 194–95). Compared to general standards, specific rules
can reduce the extent to which people use legal ambiguity to their advantage.
Nonmonetary goods and services are especially problematic because people
are better able to use elastic justifications to convince themselves of the ethi-
cality of receiving these (pp. 195–96). Individuals are also sometimes more
tempted when their behavior does not benefit them directly, but rather their
organization or a client. Scientists are motivated to cut ethical corners by the
temptation of professional prestige and recognition, so they cheat to show
positive results on clinical trials (p. 201). Self-interest entails more than
simply direct material gain.
In sum, individuals rely on justifications that render them unaware of
the wrongful nature of their conduct (p. 215). For legal regulation to address
this fact, it needs to intervene to leverage individuals’ concern for fairness
and morality (p. 218). Such interventions need to take into account not just
the influence of heuristics and biases that prevent individuals from making
rational, self-interested decisions but also the influence of the motivation to
interpret one’s behavior as consistent with that of a moral and ethical per-
16. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
17. Id. at 2588–89.
18. See pp. 172–74.
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son. Understanding motivation and not just cognition is key to encouraging
compliance by otherwise law-abiding people (pp. 224–25). Because Behav-
ioral Ethics is a relatively new field it is not yet clear how to deploy its find-
ings to law (p. 232). Going forward, it will be crucial to identify interventions
in the laboratory that make it more difficult for individuals to rationalize
wrongdoing and then export those interventions from the lab to legal regula-
tion. Some areas of law seem to hold particular promise: designing contracts
to discourage breach, providing taxpayers with clear rules, and designing
tort law to account for motivations to be careless (p. 234).
Feldman’s comprehensive summary and taxonomy of literatures on Be-
havioral Ethics, legal enforcement, and compliance represent a valuable start
to the project of integrating knowledge about human behavior into legal en-
forcement and regulation. Feldman has brought to light the cognitive and
behavioral mechanisms that easily defeat legal enforcement frameworks de-
signed to deter only the most calculative wrongdoers. At the same time,
without a fine-grained understanding of how these mechanisms come into
play in the real world, it will be difficult for legal policymakers to know
where to begin.
II. CORRUPTION: HOW MOTIVATED RATIONALIZATION ENCOURAGES
ABUSE OF POWER
A. Self-Deception: Being the Hero of Our Own Narrative
The cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that lead to unethical behav-
ior arise largely due to a single underlying motivation—to think of oneself as
a good, moral person. Even though dishonest and destructive behavior is
widespread, people want to see themselves as moral and care about morality
in the sense that they object to unethical acts performed by others.19 Moral
decisions and actions therefore are best understood when examined within
the context of the self.
Although we are motivated to enhance and maintain our self-image as a
general matter,20 thinking of ourselves as honest and moral is especially cen-
tral.21 Accordingly, nearly everyone is deeply convinced that they are a good,
moral person and that their acts are generally honorable.22 We like to think
19. Celia Moore & Francesca Gino, Approach, Ability, Aftermath: A Psychological Pro-
cess Framework of Unethical Behavior at Work, 9 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 235, 247 (2015).
20. Mark D. Alicke & Constantine Sedikides, Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection:
What They Are and What They Do, 20 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2009).
21. Dolly Chugh & Mary C. Kern, A Dynamic and Cyclical Model of Bounded Ethicality,
36 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 85, 90 (2016); Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, The Es-
sential Moral Self, 131 COGNITION 159 (2014).
22. Scott T. Allison et al., On Being Better but Not Smarter than Others: The Muhammad
Ali Effect, 7 SOC. COGNITION 275 (1989).
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that “we are heroes of our own narratives.”23 Even though we sometimes be-
have in ways that are dishonorable or unethical, we resolve this contradic-
tion through self-deception, by downplaying or reinterpreting evidence of
our wrongdoing, minimizing our own responsibility for it, and later refram-
ing it or forgetting it. Thus, we remain the hero of our own narrative and
continue to claim and believe, as former Enron executive Kenneth Lay did
after getting caught for overseeing an enormous accounting fraud, “I . . . al-
ways maintained that most important to me was my integrity . . . .”24
In the examples of corruption that follow, the perpetrators make use of a
variety of self-deception techniques to diminish their own responsibility for
their wrongdoing. These techniques might or might not successfully per-
suade others after the fact that they were not to blame or were trying to do
the right thing at the time. But for our purposes, the important role of tech-
niques of rationalization is that they are deployed initially and primarily to
persuade oneself that one can engage in the conduct in question and remain
an honest, good, and moral person.
B. Organizational Socialization and Minimization
Cheating, lying, and stealing often do not occur in a vacuum. In organi-
zations, newcomers are sometimes invited into “social cocoons” where their
induction into corruption begins with observing veteran members modeling
and easily accepting what is in fact corrupt behavior, even if no one fully
recognizes it as such. Newcomers “are encouraged to affiliate and bond with
veterans and develop desires to identify with, emulate, and please the veter-
ans,” and they are encouraged to “attribute any misgivings they may have to
their own shortcomings (particularly naivete).”25
Consider, for example, the 178 teachers and administrators in the Atlan-
ta public school system who were implicated in a scandal involving falsifying
standardized test scores.26 Much of this cheating was done by teachers and
administrators gathered in rooms, erasing wrong answers and filling in cor-
rect ones on student answer sheets. It is now well understood that the pres-
sures exerted on the Atlanta teachers were enormous: new federal education
policy had imposed aggressive goals and threatened school closures if goals
were not met. In response, the Atlanta school superintendent implemented
system-wide practices of praising and financially rewarding teachers who
met their test score goals and threatening and firing those who did not, re-
23. Celia Moore, Always the Hero to Ourselves: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical
Behavior, in CHEATING, CORRUPTION, AND CONCEALMENT 98, 98 (Jan-Willem van Prooijen &
Paul A.M. van Lange eds., 2016).
24. Id.
25. Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corrup-
tion in Organizations, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 2004, at 39, 46–47.
26. Rachel Aviv, Wrong Answer, NEW YORKER (July 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2014/07/21/wrong-answer [https://perma.cc/5MEG-V252]. The facts that fol-
low pertaining to the scandal can be located directly in the article.
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peating the mantra “No exceptions and no excuses.”27 Every fall, the district
held a convocation at the Atlanta Falcons football stadium during which the
“[s]chools that met their performance targets were seated on the field, while
schools that fell short were relegated to the bleachers.”28 To be seated in the
bleachers was to be marked as a failure.
One middle school principal was under intense pressure to cheat be-
cause teachers and administrators in the elementary schools that fed into his
school were altering student test scores. Thus, students in this middle school
who were actually reading only at a first-grade level had standardized test
scores that indicated an ability several grades higher. Under these circum-
stances there was no possible way to meet performance targets legitimately,
so he encouraged his teachers to cheat. If anyone hesitated, he said, “Are you
a team player? Are you on my team?”29 By 2009, a majority of K-8 schools in
the Atlanta public school system were regularly submitting falsified test
scores.
Notably, the more that teachers and administrators identified personally
with the success of the school and the students, the more personally invested
they became in preventing failure, and the more tempted they were to cheat.
One teacher who became involved in one school’s cheating early on and
helped scale up the system of cheating in his school was also particularly de-
voted to the students. Many of his students lived in impoverished circum-
stances, and he invited them to leave their dirty laundry in his pickup truck
so that he could wash it for them; on occasion he had students living with
him when they experienced parental absence or neglect.30 In a well-
functioning organization, identification with and commitment to one’s role
and the group is a strong predictor of compliance with workplace rules and
policies.31 But in an organization where corruption is endemic, individual
commitment and devotion can actually increase willingness to engage in rule
breaking and lawless behavior. Focusing on the social utility to the organiza-
tion makes it easier to frame one’s own dishonest actions in positive terms.32
The motivations for unethical conduct in public school cheating scan-
dals are borne out by empirical research. Concern for the well-being of oth-
ers, especially similar others, can lead people to find a way to benefit those





31. Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and the Deterrence of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 11, 13–15 (Jennifer Arlen
ed., 2018).
32. Francesca Gino et al., Self-Serving Altruism? The Lure of Unethical Actions that Bene-
fit Others, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 289 (2013).
33. Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1153 (2009).
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dents were randomly assigned to be either test takers or graders. All were
paid $2 for showing up, and at the beginning of the session, half the students
were handed a $20 bill based on a coin flip (a large sum to be paid for an ex-
periment of this kind).34 Thus, each test taker began the session as “wealthy”
or “poor,” as did each grader. In a procedure analogous to the Atlanta testing
scandal, graders had the opportunity to cheat to help test takers by falsely in-
flating the number of correct answers, thereby earning more money for the
test takers. Graders cheated quite often to benefit “poor” test takers, and
“poor” graders cheated to help “poor” test takers almost 100% of the time
when both would benefit. But even when the test taker would benefit and the
grader would lose money, graders cheated to help “poor” test takers most of
the time.35
The similarities between the results of this experiment and the behavior
of teachers and administrators in the Atlanta cheating scandal are remarka-
ble. Nearly all of the cheating in Atlanta was carried out in schools serving a
student population that was mostly African American and poor.36 In the ex-
periment, over 60% of “poor” graders inflated the number of correct answers
of “poor” test takers when doing so meant the graders earned less money
themselves.37 Apparently, the teachers and the administrators who cheated
in Atlanta were not much different than the university students in Pittsburgh
and Chapel Hill who cheated in the experiment—when given the opportuni-
ty to benefit their school or their partner, they did so, regardless of whether
they incurred benefits or costs themselves. In the context of high-stakes
standardized testing, there is some evidence that teacher and administrator
cheating to inflate student standardized test scores is not unique to Atlanta.
There have been questions raised about widespread cheating in many other
large school districts; Atlanta Public Schools was alone in being the target of
a large federal criminal investigation.38
There are several reasons why people are tempted to cheat to benefit
others. First, even when an individual stands to benefit, cheating becomes
easier to rationalize if one can point to benefits to others to prove—even if
just to oneself—that one is not acting selfishly.39 Second, feelings of empathy
can prompt people to cheat to benefit others. In one field study, state auto-
emissions testing inspectors were more prone to bend the rules to help the
34. Id.
35. Poor graders almost never cheated to help “wealthy” test takers. Id. at 1157.
36. See Aviv, supra note 26.
37. Gino & Pierce, supra note 33, at 1156.
38. See Aviv, supra note 26 (“There have been accounts of widespread cheating in doz-
ens of cities . . . .”); Michel Martin, Former Teacher Blames Education Policymakers for Atlanta
Cheating Scandal, NPR (Feb. 16, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/16/695344751
/former-teacher-blames-education-policymakers-for-atlanta-cheating-scandal [https://perma
.cc/3KRQ-FCPH].
39. Scott S. Wiltermuth, Cheating More when the Spoils Are Split, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157, 159 (2011).
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owners of regular cars pass the test compared to owners of luxury cars.40 A
follow-up lab experiment suggested that feelings of empathy for regular car
owners prompted this cheating.41 In another study, group members who in-
haled oxytocin, a hormone that promotes social bonding, were more likely to
cheat to earn more money for their group than members of a control group
given a placebo.42 The cheating prompted by oxytocin disappeared when the
potential gain benefitted the individual decisionmaker and not the group.
C. Wealth and Power
The social cocoon phenomenon points to an important feature of cor-
ruption that Feldman does not squarely address: power. Social, organiza-
tional, economic, and political power are frequently important factors in
unethical and unlawful behavior. Specifically, “individuals from different so-
cial class groups differentially value, emphasize, and behave in ways that pri-
oritize their own interests above the interests of others.”43 Compared to
lower-class individuals, those in the upper class tend to have occupations
that afford more independence from and control over other people, leading
to emphasis on individuality and entitlement. By contrast, individuals from
lower classes are more attuned to social environment due to greater vulnera-
bility. Taken as a whole, empirical evidence suggests that “whereas upper-
class individuals are comparatively less attuned to others and prioritize their
individual selves, lower-class individuals orient to others in the social envi-
ronment and prioritize those relationships.”44
Even though lower social-class individuals live in environments that are
more unstable, threatening, and resource deprived than upper-class individ-
uals, the evidence appears to suggest that the former are less inclined to en-
gage in many forms of unethical behavior than the latter.45 One study used
the make and age of vehicles to index drivers’ social class and found that,
compared to drivers of all other classes, upper-class drivers were more likely
to cut off other drivers by entering a four-way intersection without waiting
their turn.46 Adults in the laboratory were asked to report computer-
generated dice rolls to determine their eligibility for a prize. The higher the
participant’s social class, the more likely they were to cheat in reporting the
40. Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Dis-
crimination in Illicit Customer Help, 21 ORG. SCI. 1176 (2010).
41. Id. at 1177.
42. Shaul Shalvi & Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Oxytocin Promotes Group-Serving Dishones-
ty, 111 PNAS 5503 (2014).
43. Paul K. Piff et al., Wealth and Wrongdoing: Social Class Differences in Ethical Rea-
soning and Behavior, in CHEATING, CORRUPTION, AND CONCEALMENT, supra note 23, at 185,
188.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 186–87.
46. Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109
PNAS 4086 (2012).
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dice rolls, controlling for age, sex, ethnicity, religiosity, and political orienta-
tion.47 Taken together, these studies show that participants from higher so-
cial classes behaved more unethically in the world and in the lab.
These findings also help make sense of the motivations of participants in
the 2019 university admissions scandal. The parents who hired Rick Singer
to bribe and cheat their children’s way into elite colleges were wealthy, high-
income, high-status individuals. They were senior executives and CEOs,
doctors and lawyers, and Hollywood stars.48 Their motive was largely status
based. All of their children were apparently capable of being admitted to col-
lege without bribery and fraud. But they wanted to ensure that their children
went to the “right” college. For them, the “right” college is one of a tiny
group of exclusive institutions that confers the right level of “social status
and bragging rights and an aristocratic identification . . . . If you look at the
hallways of power in our society . . . you will find a lot of people with . . . de-
grees from élite schools.”49 Mitchell Stevens, a sociologist of education, as-
serts that these parents “live in a world in which the mark of good parenting
is substantially tied to where one’s children are admitted to college and uni-
versity . . . . There are bragging rights, and fear of shaming if one’s sons or
daughters are not in the running . . . .”50 A college admissions consultant re-
marked, “The parents want to brag to other parents at the grocery store
when they’re standing in line.”51 The parents apparently cheated in part to
maintain their own social status and that of their families. In this way, they
were themselves the beneficiaries of their unethical behavior, arguably even
more than their children. Individuals belonging to high social class “often
want to cement that status by making their family a permanent part of what-
ever passes for aristocracy in America.”52
On the one hand, some of the acts these parents participated in seem bi-
zarrely brazen. They helped photoshop the faces of their children onto the
bodies of star athletes; they provided samples of their children’s signature so
an adult impostor could take the SAT; they paid impostors to take online
courses to appear for credit on their children’s high school transcript; and
they “donated” large sums of cash to a fake charity used to transfer large
bribes to sailing coaches, soccer coaches, and athletic department officials.53
47. Id.
48. See supra note 3.
49. Isaac Chotiner, An Investigative Journalist on How Parents Buy College Admissions,
NEW YORKER (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/an-investigative-
journalist-on-how-parents-buy-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/482W-A3LD].




52. Chotiner, supra note 49.
53. Alia Wong, Why the College-Admissions Scandal Is So Absurd, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/college-admissions-scandal-fbi
-targets-wealthy-parents/584695/ [https://perma.cc/B9KV-69DX].
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On the other hand, the scandal arose in the context of a higher-education
landscape that itself had become rotten. Elite American families have lever-
aged their power and wealth to gain their children’s admission into elite col-
leges and universities through longstanding methods that are now widely
recognized. University admissions offices recognize “legacy” as a characteris-
tic that weighs in favor of admitting applicants whose ancestors attended the
school. Some of these parents are major donors (or viewed as potential ma-
jor donors) to the university, and the implicit reciprocity involved in these
tax-deductible transactions approaches bribery, even if it is carefully crafted
to avoid legal liability.54
Moving even further toward direct reciprocity are donations from
members of the elite who are not alumni of the school, whose children mi-
raculously gain admission after they make a massive tax-deductible gift. For
example, presidential son-in-law Jared Kushner’s father Charles Kushner, a
New Jersey real-estate developer, pledged a $2.5 million gift to Harvard while
Jared was in high school.55 Shortly thereafter, Jared, who was according to
high-school administrators a mediocre high-school student, gained admis-
sion to Harvard. Jared’s parents had not attended Harvard, so their gift was
not an alumni donation, and Jared’s admission profile did not fit into the
legacy category. This appeared to be straightforward reciprocity.56
The public is rarely privy to the explicit language with which university
officials sometimes discuss these transactions, and it can be jarring to hear
discussions where pretenses are dispensed with. Former Harvard Kennedy
School Dean David Ellwood sent an email to a Harvard admissions dean
calling him “My Hero” after the admissions dean arranged for the admission
of several applicants of interest. Ellwood called two of them “big wins” and
noted that a third person “has already committed to [donating enough mon-
ey to fund] a building.”57 In another email, a Harvard University vice presi-
dent of development opined on the possibility of future donations from the
family of a specific applicant by noting that the family had donated over $8
million in the past, that extracting further donations in recent years had
proven “challenging,” and, with some hopefulness, that the family “had an
54. Libby Nelson, The Real College Admissions Scandal Is What’s Legal, VOX (Mar. 12,
2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/12/18262037/college-admissions-scandal-felicity
-huffman [https://perma.cc/R89Y-2K2E].
55. Daniel Golden, The Story Behind Jared Kushner’s Curious Acceptance into Harvard,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-story-behind-
jared-kushners-curious-acceptance-into-harvard [https://perma.cc/EP2D-U5MX].
56. Shortly after Jared graduated from Harvard, Charles Kushner was convicted of tax
violations, campaign finance violations, and witness tampering. Since that time Harvard has
appeared to distance itself from Charles Kushner, who once served on Harvard’s Committee
on University Resources along with several hundred other wealthy donors and friends of the
university. Id.
57. Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, In Admissions, Harvard Favors Those
Who Fund It, Internal Emails Show, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.thecrimson
.com/article/2018/10/18/day-three-harvard-admissions-trial/ [https://perma.cc/REA9-2EVF].
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art collection which conceivably could come our way.”58 The applicant was
then assigned a numerical rating which would serve to increase his or her
chances of admission.59
American college and university admissions practices involve granting
favors for the children of alumni and donors. This fact is an open secret and
has been tolerated for decades by lawmakers, policymakers, politicians, and
almost everyone else, probably in part because there is a sense of powerless-
ness to change these practices.60 It was therefore absurdly ironic when the
federal prosecutor holding a press conference about Operation Varsity Blues
asserted, “We’re not talking about donating a building . . . We’re talking
about fraud.”61 The meaning here is clear: as far as the law is concerned, up-
per-crust families are free to secure their child’s admission to any university
that is willing to exchange that spot for a sufficiently large donation; but the
moment that false information about credentials is deployed, the govern-
ment will treat that as a serious criminal offense punishable by imprison-
ment.
Lawyers are well equipped to draw bright lines delineating lawful from
unlawful conduct. And wealthy clients of lawyers can benefit economically
from strategies designed to maximize gains while arguably staying within the
confines of legal rules even when the boundary between lawful and unlawful
conduct is fuzzy. For example, in 2007 J.B. and M.K. Pritzker purchased the
house next door to their residence. According to NPR, the property re-
mained vacant, and in 2015 the Pritzkers had five toilets removed from the
property, after which they claimed in their pending property tax appeal that
the property was “uninhabitable.”62 As a result, the county assessor lowered
the assessed value of the property from $6.3 million to $1.1 million, resulting
in property tax refunds and savings totaling over $300,000. J.B. Pritzker de-
fended the claims he made in his property tax appeal, saying he had “fol-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Upper class families have many other options to facilitate admission into elite uni-
versities, all involving methods not available to applicants of modest means. These include ex-
pensive private consultants who help the applicant with test tutoring and preparation,
application essay writing, and placement in internships. See Dana Goldstein & Jack Healy, In-
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/us/admissions-cheating-scandal-consultants.html
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arranging attendance at elite high schools whose graduates are sought after by elite colleges,
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lowed the rules.”63 As a general matter, tax avoidance is one way that entities
and individuals plan and arrange their affairs to minimize their tax burden
to the extent permitted by law. A client who hires a well-trained and experi-
enced lawyer has assurance that she can remain on the correct side of the
line between lawful tax avoidance and unlawful tax evasion.
By contrast, when it comes to delineating ethical from unethical con-
duct, we leave individuals to their own devices, and their devices are psycho-
logically structured to allow for bad behavior while generating
rationalizations to maintain their positive self-concepts. Arguably, the main
thing distinguishing the parents who paid Rick Singer from those who paid
universities directly is a legally substantial but ethically less visible distinc-
tion: if you simply pay for access you can avoid stepping over the bribery
line; but once you lie about material facts to gain access, you fall into the
abyss of criminal fraud.
It’s an easy mistake to make, because as a matter of ethics, it’s difficult to
distinguish the two, especially when the language of these transactions is re-
plete with euphemistic rhetoric designed to create moral wiggle room. Rick
Singer’s pitch to parents was that the admissions process to elite universities
operates through several “doors.” The front door is the one everyone sees,
which most applicants seek to enter by submitting their application and hop-
ing for the best. The back door is more discreet and is accessed by major do-
nors and other important people. Singer’s “innovation” was claiming to have
discovered a “side door” to which he had the key.64 The name of his consult-
ing company was, in fact, The Key.65 The side door was very secret, but Sing-
er promised that his key could open it every time, so long as his clients were
able to carefully follow his instructions.
This discourse of doors and keys served as a euphemism to disguise un-
ethical actions. The euphemism tells the story of the services Rick Singer
provided devoid of all the ethical implications.66 It masks repugnant acts
with neutral language. Just as Enron engaged in “aggressive” accounting
practices,67 Rick Singer found the side door and had the key. For the parents
involved in this corrupt scheme, euphemistic language renders invisible the
full truth about the unethical nature of the act. Parents are not actually
fooled by the euphemisms, of course. But euphemistic language facilitates
ethical fading, in which the unethical features of an action fade into the
background over time, enabling the actor to maintain their self-concept as a
63. Id.
64. Kate Taylor & Patrick J. Lyons, William Singer, the Man in the Middle of the College
Bribery Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/us/william
-singer-admissions-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/HU2H-ZGFQ].
65. Id.
66. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 226–28 (2004).
67. See id. at 226.
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good and ethical person.68 Singer asked his clients to write their checks out
to the tax-exempt nonprofit “Key Worldwide Foundation,” the stated pur-
pose of which was to assist “disadvantaged students around the world.”69
This fraudulent foundation further enabled the parents to creatively reinter-
pret their behavior as having a charitable component.
Rick Singer successfully persuaded dozens of parents, many (maybe
most) of them presumably otherwise law-abiding, upstanding citizens, to
commit serious felonies. He did so by leveraging the anxieties of members of
the upper class, some of whom probably convinced themselves that their
fraudulent behavior was within the acceptable boundaries of the fudge fac-
tor. The parents’ high social class seems to have played an important role in
their motivation and decisions in this case. Social class can be thought of as
having two psychological components: status and power.70 Status reflects
“respect and admiration in the eyes of others,”71 and it seems clear that what
was at stake for some parents was both achieving success and avoiding “fail-
ure.” Success came in the form of maintaining or increasing social status:
bragging rights among their peers following their child’s coveted admission
into the elite school of their choice, and “failure” came in the form of the
“shame” of their child attending a state university (even one that in objective
terms is of high quality).72
Understanding the influence of the other psychological component of
social class in this case—power—is perhaps even more crucial. Power can be
thought of as access to and control over resources, especially in relation to
others.73 In laboratory experiments, people granted power within a situation
are more likely to cheat.74 Powerful individuals whose power is unstable en-
gage in riskier behavior than do people whose power is stable.75 Individuals
with more power (assigned to be the “leader” in a laboratory task) feel enti-
68. Id.
69. Janelle Lawrence et al., For Mastermind of Vast College Scam, Fat Fees Weren’t
Enough, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-03-14/for-mastermind-of-college-entrance-scam-fat-fees-weren-t-enough
[https://perma.cc/SEB6-WVE6].
70. David Dubois et al., Social Class, Power, and Selfishness: When and Why Upper and
Lower Class Individuals Behave Unethically, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 438
(2015).
71. Id.
72. Mossimo Giannulli, one of the parents implicated in the admissions scandal, re-
quested a meeting to discuss “a roadmap for success as it relates to [our daughter] and getting
her into a school other than ASU [Arizona State University]!” See Alexandra Robbins, Kids Are
the Victims of the Elite-College Obsession, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2019) (first alteration in origi-
nal), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/college-bribe-scandal-shows-elite-col
lege-obsession/584719 [https://perma.cc/ED4J-XNLH].
73. Dubois et al., supra note 70.
74. Joris Lammers et al., Power Increases Hypocrisy: Moralizing in Reasoning, Immorali-
ty in Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737 (2010).
75. Jennifer Jordan et al., Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in
the Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530, 546 (2011).
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tled to take and do take more resources than those with less power.76 Indi-
viduals primed with power by recalling a time when they felt powerful were
more likely to take action to make their environment more comfortable by
moving a fan blowing uncomfortably in their face than individuals who were
primed with low power.77
This body of research suggests that people with power are more likely to
take action in an effort to benefit themselves. This might be because pos-
sessing power instills a sense of confidence that actions will turn out well.78
When individuals are prompted to consider a specific painful future result,
individuals with more power anticipate experiencing less pain than individ-
uals with less power,79 which seems to be consistent with the actual experi-
ences of economically secure (versus insecure) individuals.80 If it is generally
true that power “increases feelings of control and actual control, making
failure seem improbable and less painful,”81 this has implications for rule
breaking that reach far beyond corruption. These effects of power extend not
only to those inhabiting the upper social class but also to those with power in
a given social interaction. In the law enforcement context, the connection
between power and action might partly explain some instances of violent
and aggressive policing that result in unnecessary injuries and deaths. In or-
ganizational contexts, the connection between power and action might part-
ly explain supervisors’ decisions to make unwanted sexual advances or con-
contact. The question for legal policymakers is how legal institutions can
take into account individuals’ contextual propensity for wrongdoing and
psychological propensity to minimize it in order to remain the heroes of
their own narrative.
III. EXPRESSIVE LAW AND THE REGULATION OF ALL PEOPLE
A. Three Types of People?
The title of Feldman’s book refers to the law of “Good People” because it
focuses on the subset of wrongdoers who are not fully aware of the wrong-
fulness of their actions and who think that law does not apply to them be-
76. David De Cremer & Eric Van Dijk, When and Why Leaders Put Themselves First:
Leader Behaviour in Resource Allocations as a Function of Feeling Entitled, 35 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 553 (2005).
77. Adam D. Galinsky et al., From Power to Action, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
453 (2003).
78. Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinsky, Power, Optimism, and Risk-Taking, 36
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 511, 522, 530 (2006).
79. M. Ena Inesi, Power and Loss Aversion, 112 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 58, 59–60, 67 (2010).
80. See Eileen Y. Chou et al., Economic Insecurity Increases Physical Pain, 27 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 443 (2016).
81. Brian E Pike & Adam D Galinsky, Power Leads to Action Because It Releases the Psy-
chological Brakes on Action, 33 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 91, 93 (2020).
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cause law is for “bad people” and they see themselves as being among the
“good people.” Feldman’s central framework of three types of people (erro-
neous wrongdoers, situational wrongdoers, and bad people) is useful insofar
as existing enforcement frameworks that rely on customary deterrence prin-
ciples and practices are best suited for those who engage in calculative
wrongdoing (“bad people”). The prototype is the Holmesian “bad man” who
cares little for ethics and simply tries to avoid costs.82 He engages in cost-
benefit calculations and acts accordingly. Experimental research shows that
in the laboratory most people limit the magnitude of their cheating by stay-
ing within a “fudge factor” even when there is no chance of getting caught
for cheating to the maximum.83 The fudge factor serves as a crutch for indi-
viduals to avoid having the cheating negatively impact their moral self-
concept. But a smaller percentage of people do cheat to the maximum, and
these can be thought of as the “bad people” in Feldman’s framework. Feld-
man argues that existing legal regulation, liability, and punishment are ori-
ented toward this group of bad people; but because most people fall in the
other groups, we must rethink and redesign legal regulation to better address
the wrongdoing committed by “good people.”
Feldman acknowledges that the three-types framework is merely a tool
for thinking about policy design, that many “situational wrongdoers” are in
fact somewhat aware of the wrongful nature of their actions (p. 215), and
that the category membership of any single individual varies across different
behaviors and contexts (p. 232). So is the three-types framework a useful tool
for redesigning legal policy? Perhaps yes, but perhaps not as much as Feld-
man claims. Perpetrators of even the most heinous acts are sometimes im-
pressive in their powers of rationalization. Heinrich Himmler told SS officers
in 1943: “We have the moral right, we had the duty to our people to do it, to
kill this people who wanted to kill us.”84 It is conceivable that sometimes
even among the worst of the worst, the ability to remain the hero of one’s
own narrative is potent. In addition, as Feldman acknowledges, a certain lev-
el of awareness of wrongdoing by “good people” is not uncommon (p. 215).
In any case, it is difficult to know in any given instance the extent to which
an individual wrongdoer is aware of the unethicality or unlawfulness of her
act. Even if we could gauge awareness of wrongdoing in individual cases, this
information is of limited usefulness in designing legal policy.
What is important for purposes of legal policy reform is to acknowledge
that there is now strong empirical evidence that people generally are moti-
vated to find reasons to believe that what they are doing is ethically and le-
gally unproblematic. This is a problem for deterrence—both in theory and in
82. P. 85; see O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61 (1897).
83. Shaul Shalvi et al., Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals Modifies
Ethical Perceptions and Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
181 (2011).
84. Noga Arikha, How Evil Happens, AEON (July 30, 2018), https:/aeon.co/essays/is-
neuroscience-getting-closer-to-explaining-evil-behaviour [https://perma.cc/5B3Z-GN7C].
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practice—and it means that ignorance of the law, steep discount rates, and
general lack of rationality are not the only reasons that individual behavior is
difficult to predict and shape using a traditional rational choice framework.
For legal policymakers focused on improving regulation and enforcement, a
debate on the extent to which it is helpful to categorize types of bad or good
people is in my view less useful than acknowledging the brute fact of ration-
alization of wrongdoing and understanding the contextual features that give
rise to it.
In the laboratory, people who report the result of their roll of a die
sometimes cheat; but they cheat more when they are instructed to roll twice
and report only the first roll, because the second roll gives them moral wiggle
room to think of their action as “not really cheating.”85 This experimental
finding is consistent with field studies indicating that a large percentage of
corrupt individuals do not think of themselves as corrupt.86 White collar
criminals often leverage their own social advantage to convince themselves
and others that their actions could not possibly have been wrong.87 Often
these are corporate executives or government officials who think of them-
selves as “upstanding members of the community, caring parents, and givers
to charity—clearly different from the image of a typical criminal.”88
Dishonest and destructive behavior is unfortunately very common, and
with a better understanding of how individuals convince themselves that
they can engage in it while remaining a good and moral person, more of it
could be within reach of legal regulation. Common examples include public
officials grafting, athletes cheating, taxpayers underpaying, managers sexual-
ly harassing, and law enforcement officers covering up their own and one
another’s misconduct. Existing legal structures currently are not well de-
signed to regulate wrongdoers who are convinced they are doing right (or
doing an activity outside of the realm of right and wrong).
Certain pervasive wrongdoing is sufficiently low level that the cost of
regulating is largely not worth the benefit. But for pervasive activities that are
worth targeting there are success stories that might serve as templates for
improving legal regulation and enforcement. Consider intoxicated driving: a
sensible target for effective enforcement because it creates a serious risk of
harm. Importantly for the project of incorporating Behavioral Ethics into
legal policymaking, intoxicated driving is a behavior that was once not even
widely recognized as unethical. Up until the late twentieth century, it was
quite natural for individuals to drive drunk and convince themselves that
their act had no ethical implications. That attitude changed after a combina-
tion of activism, education, and legal enforcement sparked a change in social
norms, which led people to realize that the act was not just risky but also un-
85. See Shalvi et al., supra note 83.
86. Anand et al., supra note 25, at 40.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 39.
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ethical.89 With moralization of the activity came a reduction in prevalence,
spurred by statutes, enforcement, public education, and open discussion and
debate, all resulting in a change in the social meaning of the act.90 Going
forward, further reductions in the prevalence of driving under the influence
are necessary and hopefully possible,91 but in the meantime it is notable that
an act that was once generally seen as funny or normal is now more widely
condemned.
B. The Role of Expressive Law in Compliance
Criminal prohibition of intoxicated driving is one of many instances
where law punishes, but simultaneously law also seeks to persuade. Good
Samaritan laws (which impose a duty to rescue persons in danger by phon-
ing for help if it is possible to do so without putting oneself in danger) are
designed to shape beliefs about moral duties to help.92 In this way, the ex-
pressive function of law—which operates by calling out a behavior as illegal,
regardless of punishment—can potentially defeat or reduce the effectiveness
of the various rationalization mechanisms discussed earlier.
Field experiments show some promise in raising consciousness of
wrongdoing in order to prevent it. For example, the Norwegian Tax Admin-
istration successfully increased tax compliance by sending letters to taxpay-
ers.93 The specific problem it sought to address was the underreporting of
foreign income.94 New collaboration among various EU tax authorities made
it possible for the Norwegian Tax Administration to identify taxpayers who
had previously misreported foreign income.95 Letters targeting those taxpay-
ers informing them of reporting requirements prompted some individuals to
begin reporting foreign income.96 More importantly, including in the letter
language about fairness (“In order to treat all taxpayers fairly”)97 or societal
benefits (“Your tax payment contributes to the funding of publicly financed
services in education, health and other important sectors of society”)98
prompted people to report a larger share of their foreign income than letters
89. See Jonathan Rosenfeld, Impact of Safety Campaigns on Reducing Drunk Driving,
NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/impact-safety-campaigns
-reducing-drunk-driving [https://perma.cc/YA5D-L2ZZ].
90. Id.
91. Indeed, with the likelihood that legalized cannabis will lead to an increased preva-
lence of driving while under its influence, innovations in enforcement and renewed moraliza-
tion of its social meaning are critical.
92. Bilz & Nadler, supra note 8.
93. Kristina M. Bott et al., You’ve Got Mail: A Randomised Field Experiment on Tax
Evasion, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
94. Id. (manuscript at 2).
95. Id. (manuscript at 5).
96. Id. (manuscript at 17).
97. Id. (manuscript at 9).
98. Id. (manuscript at 11).
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without that language. Alternatively, including in the letter language that in-
dicated that the taxpayer was being monitored (“[We have] received infor-
mation that you have had income and/or assets abroad in previous years”)99
prompted a large number of people who had not done so previously to begin
to report foreign income.100 Note that the mechanism through which the lat-
ter intervention produced compliance is simple deterrence. But it is a means
of implementing deterrence that is not common in the United States and
might be scaled up: a personal communication from a government agency
informing you that you’ve been observed committing a specific violation and
a reminder of the specific legal duty.
Another field study examined rampant low-level cheating among cus-
tomers buying newspapers on an honor system on the street in Austria. Prior
to the intervention, two-thirds of customers did not deposit any money at
all, and those that did tended to pay a small fraction of the actual price.101 In-
cluding a moral reminder next to the price (“The paper costs €1. Thank you
for being honest.”)102 did not increase the number of people who decided to
pay, but it did encourage people who did pay to deposit an amount closer to
the actual price.103 This is a context in which Feldman’s three-types frame-
work seems to describe the situation well: the reminder prompted the erro-
neous and situational wrongdoers to pay closer to the full price, but the “bad
people” were unmoved by the prompt, and it would take a different inter-
vention to secure their compliance. Reminders need not be so explicit or di-
dactic. In another study, prompting American taxpayers to sign at the top of
a tax form before filling it out prompted more honest reporting than the
usual practice of signing at the end.104
Law can also reduce undesirable behavior by designing environments or
bureaucratic frameworks to make the problematic behavior in question in-
convenient or costly.105 Smoking restrictions prohibiting smoking inside of-
fices and most indoor spaces open to the public initially had the effect of
reducing the target behavior simply because it became much more incon-
venient.106 But once habits change, attitude change sometimes follows, espe-
99. Id.
100. Id. (manuscript at 21).
101. Gerald J. Pruckner & Rupert Sausgruber, Honesty on the Streets: A Field Study on
Newspaper Purchasing, 11 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 661, 663 (2013).
102. Id. at 667.
103. Id. at 677.
104. Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dis-
honest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PNAS 15,197 (2012).
105. Cheng, supra note 15, at 657.
106. Cf., e.g., Smokefree Policies Reduce Smoking, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco
/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/reduce_smoking/index.htm [https:
//perma.cc/7YCP-4DLE].
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cially if the individual perceives the behavior change as a product of her own
choice.107
A major theme running through Feldman’s book is that a variety of dif-
ferent legal enforcement mechanisms are needed to handle the three differ-
ent types of wrongdoers (Chapter Seven). But it is not clear that the lower
levels of awareness of situational and erroneous wrongdoers require an ap-
proach that is qualitatively different than that used for “bad people.” Many
people across different contexts have enough awareness of their own wrong-
doing that they will respond to some type of incentive. And many of these
people will respond to deterrence if the intervention leverages the social con-
text.
Consider a field experiment implemented in an area of India where, at
the time, 42% of schoolteachers would fail to show up to work on any given
day. The rate of teachers absent was cut in half simply by requiring teachers
to submit time-and-date-stamped photos of themselves at school at the be-
ginning and end of each school day. Teachers then received bonuses for at-
tending extra days and fines for skipping work.108 Teacher absenteeism was
cut in half (to 21%) among those who were monitored, and these effects per-
sisted even after monitoring ended.109 In this context it did not really matter
whether any given teacher was an erroneous wrongdoer, a situational
wrongdoer, or a bad person. A simple monitoring and incentive system ad-
dressed all three types.
There are some types of wrongdoing where it is common to find many
individuals who have convinced themselves that everyone else is engaging in
it too. This belief serves to protect individuals’ moral self-image. Expressive
law can intervene in this narrative by providing information that most peo-
ple do not in fact engage in the behavior in question, thus depriving the in-
dividual of this particular self-protective mechanism. There is reason to
think that in some contexts this intervention can be effective. For example,
taxpayers in Australia completed a survey about their views on paying taxes.
Half of the respondents then received a letter explaining that a survey
showed that “most people think we should be honest with our tax state-
ments.”110 The taxpayers who received the letter complied with their tax ob-
ligations more than taxpayers who did not learn the results of the survey.111
Under conditions of uncertainty, social consensus can serve as a powerful
107. See Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, in 17
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 229 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1984).
108. Esther Duflo et al., Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School, 102 AM.
ECON. REV. 1241, 1242–43, 1246 (2012).
109. Id. at 1243, 1251.
110. Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From The-
ory to Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 862, 874 (2005).
111. Id. at 877.
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reminder of what we are obliged to do, leading not only to conformity with
law but also to genuine acceptance of the social norm.112
C. The Role of Expressive Law in Subordination
At the same time, the assertion that the law should focus more attention
on the bad behavior of “good people” obscures a major problem in Ameri-
can criminal law enforcement today—that low-level “bad” behavior of “good
people” receives too much attention, not too little, when it is committed by
members of poor communities of color. About thirteen million Americans
per year are charged with misdemeanors, which comprise about 80% of the
nation’s court dockets.113 In some fraction of these cases the formal sentence
includes serious punishment, but in almost all cases, the process is in fact the
punishment.114 In some communities, individuals are jailed for what are es-
sentially low-level crimes of poverty: failing to pay fines for violations which
themselves carry no threat of jail time, such as traffic infractions, sleeping in
a public place, or placing one’s feet on a subway seat.115 The consequences
can strip the individual of their current job, provide serious obstacles to fu-
ture employment and education, and compromise their housing, their credit,
their eligibility for government benefits, their ability to reside in the United
States, and the custody of their children.116 Tools originally designed to inca-
pacitate, deter, punish, monitor, and control dangerous, bad people are to-
day perversely deployed against ordinary people suspected of low-level
wrongdoing. The truth of Feldman’s claim that the “bad” behavior of “good
people” should occupy more attention of the law depends on where one
looks.
Even while overenforcement of law produces serious harms, at the same
time, and counterintuitively, poor communities of color are subjected to un-
derenforcement of law.117 In Chicago, African Americans make up a third of
the city’s population but constitute about 80% of homicide victims.118 In eve-
ry major city in America, shooters who kill and injure people are infrequent-
ly brought to justice. In many cities, an arrest is made in only about one half
112. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in MORAL
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 101 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009).
113. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 2 (2018).
114. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 241–42 (1979).
115. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 11; see NATAPOFF, supra note 113, at 141.
116. NATAPOFF, supra note 113, at 19–38; Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence:
How to Add Transparency, Legitimacy, and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 124 (2016).
117. JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 35 (2017).
118. David Heinzmann, Homicide Numbers Reveal Stark Contrast, CHI. TRIB. (July 12,
2012), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-07-12-ct-met-chicago-homicide-
demographics-20120712-story.html [https://perma.cc/FX7Y-GVQN].
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of all homicides,119 and the rate is typically lower for gun homicides.120 In
New York City the 2013 clearance rate for homicides with a white victim was
86%, compared to 45% for homicides with a Black victim.121 In some cities a
substantial percentage of nonfatal shootings are never even investigated.122
The state’s failure to effectively respond to the victimization of poor com-
munities of color is an ongoing disgrace.
Both underenforcement and overenforcement have expressive potential.
Underenforcement can signal to members of vulnerable groups that their
lives do not matter, that if they are murdered, their killer will not be brought
to justice.123 “[T]he state’s response to violence against them constitutes an
expression of their worth as citizens,” and the state’s failure to enforce the
law and punish the perpetrator affirms the message of the perpetrator’s vio-
lence. 124 Overenforcement expresses that the state will target the most social-
ly vulnerable for deprivation of liberty and property, labeling those
individuals as criminals, and restricting participation in full political, social,
and economic life. And for noncitizens, “the petty-offense process has be-
come a net of exclusion through which noncitizens are intimidated, disci-
plined, and expelled.”125
These problems of simultaneous over- and underenforcement of law
have become pervasive and systemic in vulnerable communities. As an em-
pirical matter, observing the abstract fact of legal injustice makes it more
likely that individuals will engage in the kind of everyday unethicality that
Feldman discusses throughout his book: petty theft, shoplifting, tax cheating,
and the like.126 Experiencing firsthand instances of legal injustice in a sys-
tematic way perhaps compounds the problem of everyday unethicality and
distrust of legal institutions.
By the same token, improving homicide clearance rates, both by increas-
ing overall clearance rates and by eliminating racial disparities in clearance
rates, itself constitutes an expression by the state of affirming the worth of
the victims and their communities. And dismantling the system’s depriva-
tion of liberty, opportunity, and property that exclusively targets individuals
119. Murder with Impunity, WASH. POST (last updated July 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/investigations/unsolved-homicide-database/
[https://perma.cc/4K5V-DPA8].
120. Sarah Ryley et al., 5 Things to Know About Cities’ Failure to Arrest Shooters, TRACE
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/01/gun-murder-solve-rate-understaffed-police-
data-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/YQD8-Z7UJ].
121. Tuerkheimer, supra note 10, at 1153–54.
122. For example, in Oakland, CA in 2017, 40% of the felony assault unit cases were not
assigned. Ryley et al., supra note 120.
123. Nadler, supra note 10, at 184 n.162; Tuerkheimer, supra note 10, at 1154.
124. Tuerkheimer, supra note 10, at 1163; see also Kenworthey Bilz, Testing the Expressive
Theory of Punishment, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 358 (2016) (presenting empirical support
for the expressive theory of punishment).
125. NATAPOFF, supra note 113, at 204.
126. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
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in vulnerable communities constitutes an expression by state actors about
equal citizenship. Both of these efforts serve to clearly express that the power
of the criminal law will be deployed for blameworthy conduct and will not be
leveraged to generate municipal revenue or to incarcerate for unpaid fines
on noncriminal infractions like traffic tickets and housing-code violations127
and low-level offenses of the sort we all commit. Although beyond the scope
of the book, a fertile area for future exploration is how the problem of simul-
taneous over- and underenforcement of law in poor communities of color
fits into the puzzle of “the law of good people.”
CONCLUSION
The Law of Good People provides a comprehensive summary of an im-
portant body of research on Behavioral Ethics. It makes a strong case that the
bad behavior of “good people” should occupy more attention of the law and
proposes that legal policymakers construct a modified set of enforcement
tools from those used to punish serious misconduct. This framework cor-
rectly suggests that regulating “ordinary unethicality”—contract breach, tor-
tious conduct, property-rights violations, public corruption, tax cheating,
and corporate misconduct—can take into account a richer set of motivating
forces for individual wrongdoing. The book focuses on basic psychological
mechanisms of Behavioral Ethics, and theoretical debates regarding the
mechanisms through which law secures compliance. As such, it is written for
an international audience and will serve as a useful resource for legal schol-
ars, lawyers, policymakers, and social scientists interested in law and legal
institutions.
127. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 1–10.
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